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Abstract 
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official advice, particularly the supposedly factual or objective elements of advice.  Objectivity is a 
contested value and the lines are often hard to draw between bare fact, spin and 
misrepresentation.  Public servants are held to higher standards of objectivity than politicians, a 
fact on which politicians trade when they seek to attribute assessments of evidence to their 
officials. The growing openness of government documentation is placing pressure on departmental 
officials who wish to be both loyal to their political masters and honest in their factual 
assessments.  These issues are discussed with reference to recent Australian experience (and 
also with reference to the UK Hutton inquiry). 
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Abstract 
Recent controversies, eg over intelligence in Iraq, have raised problems about 
the politicisation of official advice, particularly the supposedly factual or objective 
elements of advice.  Objectivity is a contested value and the lines are often hard to 
draw between bare fact, spin and misrepresentation.  Public servants are held to 
higher standards of objectivity than politicians, a fact on which politicians trade when 
they seek to attribute assessments of evidence to their officials. The growing openness 
of government documentation is placing pressure on departmental officials who wish 
to be both loyal to their political masters and honest in their factual assessments.  
These issues are discussed with reference to recent Australian experience (and also 
with reference to the UK Hutton inquiry).  
I 
Public officials in a number of jurisdictions have recently come under fire for 
providing false or misleading information in support of government policies.  Most 
salient has been the highly controversial issue of the alleged Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) where governments in the United States and the United Kingdom 
were determined to base their decision to invade Iraq on unimpeachable evidence that 
Saddam Hussein possessed such weapons.  In consequence, their respective 
intelligence agenises were placed under extreme pressure to provide evidence to back 
up the claim and to give at least tacit support to misleadingly confident assertions 
about the existence of such weapons. The Australian government, too, as a junior 
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member of the ‘coalition of the willing’, also became implicated in the publication 
and endorsement of questionable intelligence.  In Australia, the issue of truth in 
government had earlier become entangled with the federal election in 2001 as part of 
the so-called ‘Children Overboard’ affair.  A false media report, that illegal 
immigrants had thrown their children into the sea in order to be rescued by the 
Australian navy, went uncorrected during the last four weeks of the election campaign, 
even though public servants knew within days of the original report that there were 
serious doubts about its accuracy (Weller 2002,  Marr and Wilkinson 2003,  Uhr 2005, 
ch 5).  
Such cases raised the issue of whether public servants were crossing a line 
between acting as the government’s professional advisers to becoming its partisan 
defenders. Instead of advice being independent and balanced, critics claimed, it was 
slanted in the government's favour and was being used to advance the political 
fortunes of the political party in power.  In the words of the opposition Australian 
Labor Party’s 2004 election policy document on the public service, the Coalition 
government had ‘politicised’ the public service, ‘weakening the capacity of public 
servants to give frank and fearless advice’  and intimidating officials into agreeing 
with government policy ‘ even if such statements do not accord with their objective 
statements’ (Australian Labor Party 2004).   
The main aim of this article is to examine the force of such criticism, by 
analysing the line between impartial advice and partisan advocacy within a broader 
context of the supposed ‘politicisation’ of the public service.   What counts as truth or 
objectivity in advice?   Can the very concept of truth or objectivity in politics make 
sense in a post-positivist world-view?  Is politicised distortion or misrepresentation a 
result of pressure from politicians or self-motivated?  Does politicians’ public 
 3
attribution of evidence to supposedly independent officials provide an added pressure 
towards the politicisation of such evidence?  Do public servants have an ethical 
commitment to the accuracy of the public record?  Finally, what if any connection is 
there between the politicisation of advice and politicisation of the appointment 
process.  Most of the examples quoted come from the Australian Public Service but 
reference is also made to the United Kingdom and the Hutton inquiry (Hutton 2004).  
II 
The concept of  public service ‘politicisation’ is to be understood within the 
context of the values associated with a professional public service.  In order to be able 
offer the same degree of loyal service to governments of differing political 
persuasions, professional public servants are expected to maintain a certain distance 
from the concerns of their political masters.  ‘Politicisation’ is the term used to 
describe the erosion of such distance.  It marks the crossing of a line between proper 
responsiveness to the elected government and undue involvement in the government’s 
electoral fortunes.  The term is inevitably slippery in meaning because the line itself is 
often blurred and hard to draw and because charges of politicisation are often part of 
adversarial political rhetoric.   But politicisation remains useful a useful analytical 
concept, signifying the need to protect public service professionalism and to set limits 
to the partisanship of public servants. 
Politicisation is invoked in two general areas: in relation to the methods of 
appointing and dismissing public servants and in relation to the activities in which 
public servants engage. Most academic discussion has been concerned with issues of 
appointment and tenure, especially of department heads and other senior officials (eg 
Weller 1989, 2001, Rhodes and Weller 2001, Peters and Pierre 2004).  But the 
significance of these appointment issues is grounded in concerns about public service 
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behaviour.  Politicised appointment processes, it is hypothesised, will encourage 
politicised actions on the part of public servants. In particular, politicised 
appointments will undermine the traditional political neutrality of career public 
servants and their capacity to give ministers advice that is free and frank (or ‘frank 
and fearless’ in the Australian version). It is this latter aspect, the alleged 
contamination of public service advice by concern for the partisan interests of the 
government, which has been the focus of  most recent public complaint and which 
forms the main focus of this article. 
‘Advice’ is a compendious, catch-all term for all communication between 
officials and their political masters. It includes a variety of different types of  subject 
matter and genres, including policy options, draft letters and speeches, background 
briefings, progress reports on government activities and so on.  Much of this is 
heavily political in the sense that it is delivered within the context of the government’s 
political agenda.  In the words of the guidelines issued  by the Australian Public 
Service Commission,  
good advice from the APS [Australian Public Service] is unbiased and 
objective. It is politically neutral but not naïve and is developed and offered with an 
understanding of its implications and of the broader policy directions set by the 
government’ (APSC 2003).   
 
The concept of ‘neutrality’ cannot be taken literally. The public service is not 
neutral between the government and the government’s opponents but is, in fact, 
obliged to serve the government party, often against the interests of its opponents.  
Indeed, departmental officials have always been expected to take their policy lead 
from their political masters and to tailor their advice to the policy priorities of the 
government of the day.  Political neutrality, as usually understood,  requires public 
servants to abstain from only that degree of partisanship which will compromise their 
capacity to serve alternative governments with equal loyalty.  By convention, public 
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servants tend to reserve their partisan advice for ‘policy’ matters (eg how to achieve 
the government’s partisan objective) and to abstain from ‘party’ matters, such as 
political campaigning, leaving the latter to political advisers who serve only the 
minister or government of the day.  But the line is never clear-cut and professional 
public servants in Westminster systems often engage in highly partisan activities, for 
instance, drafting speeches and letters defending government decisions and helping to 
prepare their ministers for the cut-and-thrust of parliamentary questions.  Most of this 
partisan advice, significantly, is conducted anonymously behind the scenes, with 
politicians left to take public responsibility (a point which will be returned to later). 
Provided that individual public servants are not openly identified with particular items 
of partisan advice, their capacity to offer equally partisan support to a subsequent 
government from another side of politics is not seriously compromised.   
  Current debates about the politicisation of public service advice, however, do 
not depend on a comprehensive answer to the complex question of how far public 
servants should go in their partisan assistance for the government of the day. Instead 
these debates centre on only one aspect of advice, that concerning ‘evidence’ or 
‘information’.   The focus is on statements of supposed fact where issues of truth and 
falsehood arise and where public servants can be expected to obey the injunction to be 
‘unbiased and objective’, in the words of the Australian guidelines.  For instance, the 
politicisation of advice alleged in relation to the Iraq WMD or the Children 
Overboard refers to the supposed distortion or falsification of the truth about these 
events.  Such factual elements are an important  component of public service advice 
but by no means the only component.  Advice also includes other such matters as 
policy options or recommendations where questions of truth and objectivity do not 
arise.   
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Admittedly,  politicisation or undue partisanship is also possible in relation to 
policy recommendations. For instance, public servants would not usually recommend 
the more blatant forms of partisan attack, such as the leaking of personal information 
on opposition politicians (leaving such ‘party’ matters to political advisers).  But 
where the line is to be drawn between duly and unduly partisan recommendations is 
not at issue here.  The main concern is with supposedly factual statements or evidence 
which contain deliberate falsehoods or misrepresentations of the truth designed to 
serve the partisan interests of the government.  Such falsehoods and 
misrepresentations do not exhaust the possibilities of politicised advice but they 
constitute a clear and important category of such advice. 
Though the factual elements of advice are assumed to be distinguishable from 
the broader political context within which they sit, in practice they are closely related. 
Normative policy positions typically depend on certain factual assumptions and can 
be weakened by the falsification of these assumptions. Thus, the supposed factual 
existence of Iraq’s WMD was crucial to the official case for the invasion of Iraq.  Any 
questioning of this proposition was therefore potentially damaging to the various 
governments that supported the invasion.  Governments regularly adopt and sustain 
policies for political reasons that have little to do with the stated evidence.  In such 
cases, government-provided evidence becomes the official rationale for decisions 
rather than part of their actual justification.  Hence, the motive for the politicisation of 
factual advice.  Governments are often looking for evidence that will best support 
their predetermined policies rather than the best evidence on which to ground their 
yet-to-be-determined policies.  The war in Iraq and the related intelligence 
information is a classic case of a policy position in search of evidence. 
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Distortion and politicisation of the factual elements of advice can include 
negative as well as positive misinformation, when the truth is suppressed in order to 
create a false impression (suppressio veri suggestio falsi).    The Children Overboard 
Affair is a good example of misrepresentation through the deliberate suppression of 
evidence.  Known doubts about the reliability of the original story were not formally 
conveyed to the Prime Minister, thus allowing him to sustain public support for the 
story through the all-important final days of the 2001 election campaign.  To the 
extent that public servants as well as ministerial advisers were involved in the 
suppression, their advice can be described as involving politicised misinformation – 
truth misrepresented to suit to the partisan interests of the government.  Indeed, the 
whole practice of plausible deniability, by which political leaders are deliberately kept 
in the dark in order to be able to deny personal knowledge and therefore responsibility 
for disreputable decisions (Ellis 1994), can be seen as a form of politicised 
misinformation.   Officials connive in a deliberately incomplete and therefore 
misleading version of events in order to deceive the public and save their leaders’ 
reputation.   
III 
On this analysis, the accusation of politicised information or evidence assumes 
a logical distinction between statements of fact or empirical statements, which can be 
true or false and therefore subject to distortion and misrepresentation, and statements 
of value or recommendation, which are more subjective and contestable. Such a 
distinction is itself epistemologically contestable and is, indeed, illegitimate from 
some philosophical standpoints, for instance those of post-modernists and anti-
positivist critical theorists who deny the possibility of objectivity.  These theorists 
claim that, because all advice takes place within a political context, it is inevitably 
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coloured by that context. All language is part of some discourse and every discourse 
reflects a particular dispensation of power, actual or preferred, and therefore a 
particular political standpoint.  From this point of view, all language is politicised and 
the search for unpoliticised ‘unbiased and objective’ evidence or information is 
fruitless and naïve.  
The objection can be countered in various ways.  One is by a simple assertion 
of common sense, that truth/falsehood and objectivity are taken for granted in 
everyday discourse and that the notion of distorting or misrepresenting truth for 
partisan purposes makes obvious sense within that discourse. A statement that Iraq 
possessed weapons of mass destruction or that children were thrown overboard is 
either true or false and is therefore capable of being distorted for political reasons.   
Conversely, a statement that Australia was right to join the United-States-led coalition 
of the willing is not a matter of truth or falsehood, because it is based on contestable 
political values, such as the importance of the United States alliance to Australia.  
Those who wish to deny any vital epistemological distinction between the two types 
of statement are not only flying in the face of public opinion. They are also dealing 
themselves out of any right to complain of falsehood, bias or misrepresentation on the 
part of governments.  
A philosophically more sophisticated response might acknowledge that 
objectivity itself, though not illusory, is not incontestable.  ‘Brute’ facts may be 
relatively straightforward but many empirical statements and much so-called 
‘information’ contain contestable elements which can be the subject of legitimate 
disagreement.  For instance, the meaning of the terms themselves may be in dispute, 
as, for instance, in what counts as a weapon of mass destruction.  Secondly, once 
definitional issues are settled, the evidence itself may be ambiguous and inconclusive, 
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as in the existence of WMD.  Here, where the truth is unclear, the requirement of 
objectivity cannot be met  by just a simple obligation to tell the truth and avoid 
falsehood.  Objectivity and impartiality imply much more: an open-minded attitude in 
the assessment of evidence, balance and lack of bias in the selection and weighing of 
known facts, and caution about drawing stronger conclusions than the evidence will 
reasonably support.   
These characteristics provide the standards of evidence and argument 
commonly accepted, for instance, by social scientists of positivist leanings, by policy 
researchers seeking to base policy recommendations on reliable evidence, or by 
intelligence experts trained to give reliable assessments of the military capacity and 
intentions of foreign powers.  For those of a more critical cast of mind, these 
standards of ‘objectivity’ and ‘impartiality’ may lack independent validity but can be 
seen more as epistemological norms operating within particular epistemic 
communities, such as social science research communities or intelligence 
communities.   They are an intrinsic part of the ethos that supports the continuing 
power of professional public services (Richards and Smith 10).  However described, 
these standards place limits on what can properly and credibly asserted by members 
of the relevant communities. In the Iraqi WMD case, a clear contrast can be drawn 
between, on the one hand, those intelligence reports that carefully weighed the 
evidence and surrounded their assessments with due qualifications, thus meeting the 
requisite standards of objectivity and balance and, on the other hand, reports that 
sought to assess the evidence in a way most suited to government policy and were 
prepared to slant presentation of the evidence in that direction.   
The tension between objective and biased assessment and the difficulty in 
drawing a line between the two was well illustrated by the UK government’s 
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instructions to its Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in relation to its dossier on Iraq’s 
WMD.  As documented in the Hutton report, the JIC was to make a case against 
Saddam Hussein that was  ‘as strong as the evidence properly permitted’, though 
nothing was to be said ‘with which the intelligence community was not entirely 
happy’ (Hutton 2004, 320).  
On the one hand, this instruction appeared to require the committee not to go 
beyond the evidence and thus to retain objectivity. On the other hand, the request for a 
case ‘as strong as the evidence properly permitted’ could be seen as amounting to a 
request to slant the evidence in a particular direction and thus to depart from a strictly 
objective standpoint.  A truly objective account would surely have asked  for a case 
‘as strong or as weak as the evidence properly permitted’.  Indeed, as Lord Hutton 
remarked (ibid 320), the notion of ‘sexing up’ evidence need not imply the actual  
inclusion of information known to be false or unreliable (what can be described as the 
‘strong’ sense of sexing-up).  Sexing-up can also have a weaker sense meaning the 
attempt to manipulate evidence for misleading effect, or ‘spin’.  His Lordship chose to 
adopt the stronger sense, the inclusion of information know to be false or unreliable, a 
charge from which the JIC’s dossier was exonerated.  Had he chosen the weaker sense, 
the manipulation of information for misleading effect, he could have found the 
government’s instruction to build the strongest possible case for the existence of 
weapons to be an instruction to sex up the evidence.  Certainly, such a version would 
not be the same as one produced by an objective and impartial expert observer with 
no policy preferences.  Indeed, the subsequent Butler review (Butler 2004) criticised 
the JIC for allowing the dossier to exclude many of the qualifications and caveats in 
the earlier intelligence assessments. In terms of the suggested meaning of 
politicisation of information and evidence (‘deliberate falsehoods or 
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misrepresentations of the truth designed to serve the partisan interests of the 
government’), politicisation covers both the weak and the strong sense of sexing-up.     
Imputations of bias or ‘spin’ in the assessment and presentation of evidence can 
themselves involve contestable interpretative judgments.  The term ‘spin’ covers a 
spectrum of possibilities between unvarnished truth and outright lying, ranging from 
the relatively innocent  presentation of all the relevant  facts in a favourable light to 
the partial selection of facts to suit a particular case.  The line between favourable 
presentation and actual misrepresentation is a fine one (Humphreys 2005).  Standards 
of objectivity, too, whether grounded in positivist assumptions or contextually defined, 
are by no means clear-cut in application. Disagreement is particularly likely once 
assertion moves beyond statements of bare, uncontrovertible facts to matters of 
judgment in the assessment of doubtful evidence.  On politically controversial issues 
where experts conscientiously disagree, such as the reasons for climate change or the 
effects of minimum wages on unemployment, the issue of  partisan bias is especially 
likely to arise and may be hard to dispel.   
The claim of distortion or misrepresentation is on much stronger ground if 
critics can point to the deliberate purveying of known falsehoods.  Indeed, it is for this 
reason that the most effective accusations of politicised information tend to 
concentrate on a solid core of incontrovertible fact – whether children were thrown 
overboard or who knew what about what and when.  Once ‘information’ moves into 
more contentious areas where evidence must be assessed and competing assessments 
are possible, the line between deliberate misinformation and honest disagreement is 
much harder to draw. 
IV 
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The objectivity of public service advice can be an issue in two distinct arenas.  
One is internal to the executive and concerns the relationship between ministers and 
their officials where sound policy-making needs to be based on the best available 
evidence. The second is more public and concerns the relationship between the public 
service, the elected government and the public.  Much information produced  by 
government advisers not only serves as internal, confidential advice for ministers but 
also reaches the public realm as part of the public record.    
All those in public life, including elected politicians, are expected to be 
truthful and face serious political consequences if found to have lied.  Politicians, 
however, are regularly given more license because of their recognised role in partisan 
debate and political advocacy.  Outright lies carry political risks, but short of that, the 
demands of democratic discourse often require politicians to dissemble and 
prevaricate in their efforts to win support for their policies.  Career public servants, on 
the other hand, are held to higher standards of objectivity.  Having no electorally 
partisan role and therefore with no political axes to grind, they can therefore be relied 
on for honest judgments.   
The force of this expectation is evident from the way in which politicians 
themselves  publicly rely on the supposed objectivity of their official advisers.  
Ministers wishing to vouch for the reliability of the information they are conveying 
regularly preface their public statements with remarks such as ‘my department advises 
me that’ or ‘according to advice from my departmental officials’.  One reason for 
such attribution may be to disown responsibility in case the information later turns out 
to be incorrect.  But another motive is often to vouch for the reliability of the 
information. Minister’s statements can carry much greater credibility if they are 
sourced to non-partisan officials than if they were simply the opinions of ministers 
 13
themselves or of their political advisers.  By the same token, if  information attributed 
to public servants has been distorted to suit the government’s political interests, the 
public is being deliberately deceived through a form of misrepresentation in which 
politically partisan opinion is being passed off as objective and politically neutral. 
Most of the current debate about the supposed politicisation of public service 
advice refers to this issue of politically distorted evidence being publicly attributed to 
public servants in order to provide it with independent authority and therefore greater 
reliability.  The issue is not about what may or may not have been said by officials to 
politicians behind closed doors as part of the frank exchanges of confidential policy 
debates.  It concerns the public attribution of certain statements to officials as means 
of gaining apparently objective and independent support for government policies.  
The whole debate over Iraqi WMD turned on the fact that political leaders wanted 
their intelligence agencies to vouch for an assessment that supported a pre-emptive 
attack. The point of the ‘sexing-up’ controversy was that the politicians and their 
advisers were accused of wanting to put their own distorted versions of events into the 
mouths of apparently independent officials and thus to pass these versions off as 
independently authoritative.  As the Butler review pointed out 
The advantage to the Government of associating the JIC’s name with the 
dossier was the badge of objectivity that it brought with it and the credibility which 
this would give to the document (Butler 2004, 78) 
 
Ministers and their advisers, of course, are free to 'sex up' official advice, and 
do so regularly as part of normal political debate and government spin.  Public 
servants may also be called on to assist in the drafting of persuasive and tendentious 
material for their political masters.  But when politicians, instead of taking 
responsibility for such material themselves,  explicitly attribute it  to their officials, 
they are trading on, and abusing, the integrity of the public service.  It is this public 
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attribution of  politically biased judgments to professional officials as part of the 
government’s advocacy of controversial policies which provides a new and dangerous 
precedent. Government spin is one thing (and nothing new).  Government spin 
masquerading as official and objective advice is quite another.   
V 
Responsibility for distorting public service advise in the partisan interests of 
government can vary.  Sometimes, the main initiative comes directly from politicians 
exerting explicit pressure on officials.   The Hutton inquiry, for instance, unearthed 
clear evidence of such direct pressure from No 10 on the Joint Intelligence Committee, 
at least to the extent of seeking the best possible slant on available intelligence.  For 
the most part, however, and for obvious reasons, clear evidence of such direct 
pressure is obviously hard to discover.  Such instructions would rarely be committed 
to paper and would themselves be the subject of plausible deniability. However, 
political pressure on officials to distort their findings need not come in the form of 
direct and explicit instructions from politicians or their advisers.  It is more likely to 
be indirect and unstated, the result of officials anticipating unfavourable reactions to 
unpopular advice.  If public servants believe they will be penalised by the their 
political masters if they tell the unvarnished truth, they will tend to  tailor their 
evidence to what they believe the government wants.   
Such pressure is hard to discover; knowledge of its existence depends on the 
reported motivations of public servants who have an obvious professional interest in 
denying that they are cowed by their political masters. Moreover, when public 
servants do choose to distort their evidence to suit the government’s policy priorities, 
it is often not clear whether they are acting under indirect pressure from politicians or 
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purely voluntarily, out of their own partisan support  for the government (as may have 
been the case with the JIC’s dossier).    
The possibility of such pressure over WMD was a key issue in Australia.    
Among the intelligence agencies themselves, most scrutiny was directed at the Office 
of National Assessments (ONA), a body that provides government with overall 
assessments of intelligence received from a variety of sources, including other 
government intelligence organisations, such as the Defence Intelligence Organisation 
(DIO).  A joint parliamentary committee (Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, 
ASIS and DSD 2004) found that, on one occasion in September 2002, in meeting a 
request from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,  ONA had mysteriously 
diverged from DIO in its assessment of Iraq’s weapons.  More generally, a senior 
member of ONA, Andrew Wilkie, who resigned in 2003 in opposition to the 
government’s support for the war in Iraq, later claimed that   
 
Most junior analysts try to offer frank and fearless advice. But the process is 
flawed. It involves so many layers of politically astute managers that the final 
result is often a report so bland as to be virtually worthless, or skewed ever so 
subtly towards the Government's preferred line. Better that, management 
would argue, than a brave report prepared in good faith that contradicts 
Government thinking or is likely to prove wrong over time (Sydney Morning 
Herald 31 May 2003) 
 
Here, the charge of politicised distortion is clear but whether in response to indirect 
pressure from the government or a voluntary subservience is less clear.  A subsequent 
government inquiry conducted by Philip Flood, a former Head of ONA and then 
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, exonerated  all the 
intelligence agencies, including ONA, from all charges of yielding to political 
pressure, covert or overt.  However, it did note that ONA had concluded that Iraq had 
WMD, even though DIO had declined to draw this conclusion. The report also 
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pointed to the lack of ‘a rigorous culture of challenge’ in ONA, a characteristic that 
could encourage  voluntary politicisation. 
Indirect political pressure, being harder to detect, is also harder to refute.  Not 
surprisingly, politicians themselves, when under accusations of politicisation, single 
out the more overt form of direct instruction.  Having claimed that they issued no 
direct instructions to falsify the record, they wash their hands of the charge of 
politicisation, as did Prime Ministers Howard and Blair, in triumphant response to the 
Flood and Hutton reports respectively.  But  indirect pressure is just as effective and, 
arguably, more insidious.  Even more insidious, perhaps, is the  
distortion which arises without any pressure, from the unforced eagerness of officials 
to assist their government’s case.  The focus on direct pressure is driven by the 
dynamics of political debate and the desire of opposing politicians and the media to 
catch political leaders out in blatant deceit.  But this obsession with finding a 
politician with a smoking gun can obscure the wider problem of institutionalised 
politicisation.  
Similar issues were raised by a controversy over research into higher 
education policy conducted within the Department of Education Science and Training.  
In 2001, the Department announced a wide-ranging retrospective inquiry into national 
policy in higher education during the previous decade. It commissioned a number of 
contributions from outside experts as well as from researchers within the Department.  
When various sections of  the report were collated and eventually published two years 
later, it turned out that the Department had removed a section dealing with the 
possible effects of changes to the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS).  
Research conducted by researchers within the Department reportedly indicated that 
the government’s decision to lower the income threshold at which students would be 
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required to start repaying their contributions had led to a reduction in part-time 
enrolments.  Such a finding would have offered ammunition to the government’s 
critics who had been claiming, in spite of government denials, that HECS had had an 
adverse effect on equity of access.  The official reason given by the Department 
Secretary for removing the offending section was ‘methodological difficulties 
inherent in research of this kind and the incompleteness and inclusiveness of some of 
the findings’ (Harmer 2003).  The Opposition and some journalists, however, claimed 
that the real reason was political pressure. The research findings would clearly have 
been embarrassing for a government eager to minimise any adverse effects of changes 
to HECS. 
The charge of politically inspired suppression in this case depends on the 
supposed inadequacies of methodology and on other alleged scientific deficiencies of 
the research.  On this point, the balance of argument is not favourable to the 
government or the Department.  The researchers concerned were well respected in 
their field and their research methodology was publicly supported by other experts. 
The suspicion (it can be no more) remains that allegedly independent research was 
altered for political reasons.    
Opposition politicians tried unsuccessfully to implicate the Minister and his 
personal advisers in the decision to alter the research report.  The new Department 
Secretary, Jeff Harmer, categorically asserted that the decision was that of his 
predecessor as Secretary, Dr Peter Shergold, and his alone (Harmer 2003).  In relation 
to possible undue political influence on the public service, however, the question of 
who actually made the decision is of secondary importance.  If the decision was 
motivated by a desire to protect the government from evidence which was politically 
embarrassing but otherwise soundly based, then it matters little whether the order 
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came directly from the Minister and his staff or whether a compliant Secretary acted 
out of concern not to undermine the government.  In either case, evidence was being 
suppressed and research findings doctored for partisan purposes.   
Ironically, when the Department was eventually shamed into publishing the 
actual research in question (DEST 2003), the findings turned out to be much less 
damaging to the government’s case than the critics had been arguing.  The main 
conclusion was that, overall, HECS had had only marginal effect on equity of access 
to university.  If the report had been published in its original form it would  have 
caused much less political embarrassment than any attempted cover-up.  Indeed, if the 
Department had not rashly decided in the first place to publicise its inquiry and its 
findings, the offending sections of the report could have been quietly suppressed 
without controversy. 
As is evident from these cases, a major incentive for political distortion of 
public service reports derives from the decision to make the reports publicly available.  
By contrast, evidence that potentially undermines government policy but which is 
kept confidential to government can more readily be allowed to remain undoctored.  
For instance, the current Australian Treasurer, Peter Costello, has so far successfully 
prevented release of Treasury reports on the effects of ‘bracket creep’ (when pay 
increases move taxpayers into higher tax  brackets) and of the cash grant for first-
home buyers (which was said to have been subject to fraud, to have benefited a large 
number of very wealthy homebuyers and to have helped to inflate house prices).   The 
Treasurer was able to block access to these documents under Freedom of Information 
legislation by invoking the ‘public interest’ exemption and issuing a ‘conclusive 
certificate’, a decision subsequently upheld in both the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal and the Federal Court (a further appeal to the High Court is pending at the 
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time of writing). Arguments given against releasing the documents included claims 
that such a decision would damage the Treasury’s ability to communicate in writing 
with the Treasurer on sensitive issues and that the documents were too technical to be 
understood by the public (The Australian 22 July 2004).  There seems little doubt, 
however, that a major reason for suppression was that the reports contained 
information that could have cast doubt on the effectiveness of government policy.   
In an era of greater openness of government information, officials are under 
greater pressure not to embarrass politicians with unpalatable facts that will provide 
ammunition for the government’s political enemies.   Whether such pressure on 
officials is direct and overt or indirect and institutionalised, the officials are at least 
partly responsible for politicising their advice.  In another type of politicisation, 
however,  public servants are free of responsibility and blame, at least initially.  This 
is where politicians themselves misrepresent the advice they are given, wrongly 
attributing a distorted version of the evidence to public servants in order to give the 
version a spurious air of independence and authenticity.   In Australia, for instance, on 
the issue of Iraq and its alleged WMD, no incontrovertible evidence has emerged that 
frontline intelligence agencies, particularly the Defence Intelligence Organisation 
(DIO),  were themselves complicit in any direct distortion of the evidence.  But there 
can be no doubt that Ministers were prepared to distort their findings.  Ministers 
clearly used the intelligence selectively, omitting many of the qualifications with 
which intelligence reports were circumscribed (Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
ASIO, ASIS and DSD (2004)).  In doing so, they were attributing opinions to 
intelligence agencies which the agencies themselves had not necessarily supported. In 
such a context, the mere removal of qualifying caveats and doubts, with which many 
of the reports were hedged, was sufficient to distort their meaning.  The standard 
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government excuse became that intelligence was an inexact science which allowed 
room for disagreement and for differences of emphasis and interpretation.  The excuse 
is disingenuous, similar to the Blair government’s support for a case ‘as strong as the 
evidence properly permitted’.  If the evidence allows a range of possibilities, the 
genuinely impartial and objective approach is to mention the whole range, from 
weakest to strongest, and not to focus on the most politically convenient version.  
Government versions which attribute a false impression of certainty to official 
reports in order to buttress the government’s case clearly count as the politicisation of 
evidence in the sense that undue political influence has been exercised over the 
reporting and advising function.  Even though officials are blameless for the distortion 
they are still placed in a difficult ethical position in relation to their political masters.  
Once the false attribution becomes part of the public record, public servants can 
themselves become complicit in maintaining a public falsehood.  If they keep their 
counsel as loyal public servants, they are acquiescing in a deceit and lending it 
credence, thus in effect becoming party to the deceit.  They may confidentially advise 
the government that their evidence has been misrepresented, but they cannot usually 
expect a government retraction.  Their only other alternative to guilty acquiescence is 
to breach professional loyalty by leaking to correct the public record, an action that 
risks career damage and even criminal prosecution, as in the classic UK case of Clive 
Ponting (Norton-Taylor 1985).    
VI 
In a climate of greater openness, more public service advice is expected to be 
made public. Even when reports are likely to remain confidential under well-
established exemptions to freedom of information, such as considerations of national 
security, governments find themselves under pressure to buttress their policies and 
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decisions by reference to official research.  In this respect, the controversy over 
intelligence about Iraq is particularly illuminating.  Governments were not legally 
obliged to publish intelligence findings, either in whole or in part.  None the less, they 
saw such evidence as crucial to winning the battle for public opinion and chose to 
take the unusual step of releasing it themselves.   
This new culture of exposure places new and unwelcome pressure on 
departmental officials collecting evidence relevant to government policy. They can no 
longer expect their reports always to remain confidential.  Suppressing unpalatable 
findings has become increasingly problematic, as indicated by the adverse publicity 
surrounding the Treasurer’s resort to conclusive certificates to defend the 
confidentiality of Treasury research.   In such a context, if ministers cannot rely on 
keeping awkward information secret, they will naturally aim to manipulate more open 
systems to their advantage by producing official evidence that supports their policies 
and by reducing the collection of uncomfortable facts in a form which will allow 
subsequent publication.  Departmental officials, obliged to keep a public face of 
loyalty to ministers, will hesitate about recording evidence that could be used to 
challenge government policy.  Indeed, the recently retiring Australian Public Service 
Commissioner, Andrew Podger, drew attention to just such a trend among 
Commonwealth public servants: 
There is widespread concern in Government and the senior echelons of the 
service that FOI has so widened access to information that counter-measures 
are needed.  Fewer file notes, diaries destroyed regularly, documents given 
security classifications at higher levels than are strictly required to minimise 
the chances of FOI access….departments are not only publishing less policy 
research but are conducting less (Canberra Times: Public Sector Informant  5 
July 2005).  
 
Public servants are subject to conflicting ethical pressures arising from two 
public service principles. On the one hand, they are obliged to provide ministers with 
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unbiased and objective information and evidence. On the other hand, they are bound 
to avoid embarrassing  their ministers in public.  So long as embarrassing advice can 
be kept securely confidential, the two imperatives are compatible. However, once 
confidentiality is no longer assured, tensions begin to arise between them.  
Departmental research conducted under the assumption that ministers can ultimately 
decide whether or not to release it may be more likely to be objective and unbiased 
than research where officials know in advance that their findings may be published.  
If public servants believe that their advice will become public and possibly embarrass 
their ministers they will be under an incentive to pull their punches. 
Admittedly, confidentiality is not a guarantee of objectivity, as for instance in 
the alleged bias of ONA reports which were not destined for any public dossier but 
were still written with an eye to not upsetting ministers.  But the possibility of 
openness increases the urge to trim to suit the government line. Thus pressure on 
public servants to ‘sex up’ their advice is not just a result of overweening politicians 
or weak-kneed public servants.  It also derives from the more open environment in 
which both sides now operate.   Governments want to be able to trade on the public 
service’s reputation for integrity by attributing evidence to their officials.  Officials 
want to serve their political masters loyally and thus avoid publicly undermining their 
credibility. 
The best guarantee that published government research will be unbiased and 
immune to political pressure is to provide those who conduct it with a degree of 
institutional independence.  Indeed, some important providers of public information 
are well protected. Perhaps the leading instance is the statutory independence granted 
to government statistics offices, such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics which is  
responsible for the census and for much of the objective information underlying 
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political debate. Australia also has a number of other arms-length research institutes 
in various areas of public policy, such as health (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare) , crime (Australian Institute of Criminology) and agriculture (Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics).  These institutes, while lacking the 
statutory independence of the Bureau of Statistics, are protected, to some extent at 
least, from direct ministerial control.  Even so, however, in their choice of research 
topics, they tend to avoid issues where research might throw doubt on government’s 
firmly held policies.  
Within government departments themselves, some areas of public data 
collection can, in practice, be quarantined from political interference, for instance 
straightforward quantitative information such as head counts of welfare recipients or 
the size of defence forces.  In addition, the Treasury issues a range of economic data, 
particularly through the annual budget papers where accuracy and objectivity are 
taken for granted. However, without the protection that comes from either 
institutional independence or routinised data collection and information, government 
departments may be under pressure to gild the lily if they suspect their advice is 
destined for the public arena.  Over time, these trends will undermine the very 
reputation for objectivity on which politicians rely when they attribute statements to 
their officials. A cynical public when offered a statement such as ‘my department 
assures me’ or ‘our intelligence sources tell us’ will simply treat it yet more 
government spin. 
VII 
Does any of this matter and if so why? The case for accuracy and objectivity 
in the collection and reporting of official information rests on two types of 
consideration, based on the two arenas in which such information is presented. The 
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first concerns the internal, confidential  relationship between ministers and public 
servants and relates to the need for accurate information as a basis for sound decision-
making.  The arguments are managerial and practical in nature and by no means 
exclusive to government, applying equally to all decision-makers in complex 
organisations.  Boards of directors and chief executives in commercial companies 
typically place a similar premium on sound information and robust advice, 
confidentially given.  Free and frank advice, in this sense, is not a uniquely public 
service value but it is a public service value none the less.  If advice to ministers, for 
instance in intelligence assessments, is trimmed in fear of giving political offence, 
then the quality of government decision-making must suffer.   
The second type of consideration concerns the relationship between government 
and its citizens and the publication of government information. Citizens have a 
general right to expect that information provided by their leaders and government 
officials will be factually correct, not just because it will help good decision-making 
but because it will form a reliable basis for public discussion.  Accuracy of the public 
record is one of the foundations of democratic dialogue and the role of public officials 
is crucial in guaranteeing such accuracy.    
As noted earlier, the demand for honesty in government falls on both politicians 
and public servants but more on the latter than the former.  The professional public 
servant’s distance from the sharp of end of partisan conflict and political debate 
enables him or her to operate with higher standards of commitment to accuracy and 
objectivity.  If we value integrity in public life, these standards should not be allowed 
to be compromised.  Framing the standards in terms of free and frank advice, as is the 
common practice, privileges the managerial relationship between officials and 
government.  It is for this reason that more emphasis should be given to the value of 
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safeguarding the accuracy of the public record as an independent public service value. 
Such a value appears to be implicit in public expectations surrounding the cases 
mentioned in this paper.  Here, the underlying presumption has been that information 
emanating from the public service is accurate and objective and should not be 
distorted for partisan reasons.  But the importance of truth and objectivity as public 
values are not sufficiently emphasised in public sector codes of ethics.  They are 
missing, for instance, from the Australian guidelines.  Governments are naturally 
unwilling to sanction leaking and whistle-blowing aimed at correcting the public 
record. But without more emphatic reinforcement, the departmental official’s 
commitment to truth and objectivity will not be able to prevail against growing 
pressures to lend public support to government policy. 
VIII 
Finally, what, if anything, does the politicisation of evidence and information 
discussed in this paper have to do with the alleged politicisation of senior pubic 
service appointments, particularly to the highest rank of Secretary, as claimed,  for 
instance,  by the Australian Labor Party.  Appointment and retention procedures 
become politicised when the merit principle is compromised by undue political 
intervention (Peters and Pierre 2004, 2).  Whether politicisation requires appointment 
on the basis of partisan sympathy or also encompasses political appointments on other 
grounds such as personal compatibility or policy direction is disputed.  On one view,  
the latter should be described as ‘personalised’ rather than ‘politicised’ appointments 
(Weller 1989; Weller 2001;  Rhodes and Weller 2001); on another view, any political 
appointment on grounds other than professional merit counts as politicisation (Mulgan 
1998).    
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The extent of  politicisation in senior appointments to the Australian Public 
Service, however defined, has been fully discussed by others (notably  Patrick Weller 
(Weller1989; Weller 2001) and John Halligan (Halligan 2005)).   In spite of the 
removal of guaranteed tenure for Secretaries from the mid 1990s  and the active 
involvement of the Prime Minister and other ministers in Secretary appointments, the 
APS remains comparatively unpoliticised. Appointment on blatantly partisan lines is 
rare (though not unknown) and most (though not all) senior public servants avoid 
partisan identification with the government of the day.  Commitment to a career 
public service profession remains generally strong.   
The connection between the appointment process and politicisation of 
behaviour, including the reporting of research and other  information, is at most a 
contingent one.  A career public servant appointed on merit is quite capable of 
distorting the public record to suit the government of the day, just as a politicised 
appointee may behave as a principled professional, resisting pressure to slant 
information to suit the government’s line.  In the Iraq WMD affair, intelligence 
agencies in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia were all subjected to 
similar political pressure from their leaders and all reacted with a similar combination 
of professional disquiet and reluctant compliance, even though the leaders of the 
United States CIA were political appointees while their United Kingdom and  
Australian counterparts were career professionals. 
At the same time, one would expect that reduced job security, even among 
professional career public servants, might increase their reluctance to stand up to 
ministers on matters of professional principle, including a commitment to accuracy 
and objectivity.  However, it would be unwise to read too much into this argument or 
to assume that public servants with secure tenure would never indulge in politicised 
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advice.  Ian Hancock’s account of the VIP Affair of the late 1960s (Hancock 2003) 
provides a healthy antidote to any nostalgia for a supposedly golden age of public 
service integrity. In that affair, senior public servants were aware that ministers had 
lied about the existence of VIP fleet records and they did their best to help their 
ministers avoid discovery.  The overriding sense of loyalty to ministers and the 
government of the day appears to have been no weaker then than now. The main 
difference with the present era was the comparative lack of transparency. Before the 
development of the Senate committee system and FOI, public servants went 
unquestioned and disreputable secrets were much more easily hidden from public 
view.   
The greater transparency of the current era may be seen to cut both ways.  On 
the one hand, it increases the likelihood that government deceptions will be uncovered 
and thus acts as a spur to government honesty.  On the other hand, the fact that more 
public service advice may end up in the public arena places officials under greater 
pressure to compromise with the truth in the interests of not undermining the 
credibility of their political masters.  
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